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The FOMC: Preferences, Voting, and Consensus
Ellen E. Meade
erences drawn from the transcripts of FOMC
meetings during the Greenspan years to investi-
gate the claim that the votes cast by Fed policy-
makers do not reflect their “true preference.”
In FOMC meetings during Alan Greenspan’s
tenure as Chairman and for which verbatim tran-
scripts have been made available, the structure of
the meeting has been more or less fixed with two
“rounds” of discussion.1,2 During the first round
of discussion, participants offered their views on
the economic situation and frequently positioned
T
he Federal Reserve’s monetary policy
committee, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), is generally viewed
as a group in which dissent is infre-
quent and many decisions are taken unanimously.
In writing about the transparency practices of
the world’s major central banks, Blinder et al.
have argued (2001, p. 39) that “it is widely known
that individual [FOMC] members often do not
vote their true preference. Instead, each commit-
tee member decides whether to support or oppose
the chairman’s [Alan Greenspan’s] policy recom-
mendation, which is almost always made first.
And Fed traditions dictate that a member should
‘dissent’ only if they find the majority’s (that is,
the chairman’s) opinion unacceptable.” In this
paper, I construct and examine a dataset of pref-
In this paper, the author develops and uses an original dataset collected from the internal discussion
of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy committee (the Federal Open Market Committee [FOMC]
transcripts) to examine questions about the Committee’s behavior. The data show that Chairman
Alan Greenspan’s proposals, after Committee discussion, were nearly always adopted unmodified
in the formal vote. Despite the external appearance of consensus with little disagreement over
decisions and an official dissent rate of 7.5 percent, the data reveal that the rate of disagreement
in internal Committee discussions was quite high—on the order of 30 percent for discussions of
the short-term interest rate. And, under the assumption that FOMC voters assigned a higher priority
to their preferences for the short-term interest rate than for the bias in the policy directive, it can
be shown that this bias was important for achieving consensus, which supports and extends the
results of Thornton and Wheelock (2000). Thus, the novel dataset described in this paper helps
to shed some light on the internal workings of the FOMC in the Greenspan years.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2005, 87(2, Part 1), pp. 93-101.
1 For more detail, see FOMC transcripts and Meyer (2004).
2 Over the period examined, the FOMC set long-run monitoring
ranges for the monetary aggregates (as required by the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act) at its first and fourth meeting each year; the deter-
mination of these ranges was taken up in a separate round of
discussion.
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© 2005, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.themselves with respect to a forecast prepared by
the Fed staff. In addition, the presidents of the 12
Federal Reserve Banks provided some specific
information about economic developments in
their regions. Greenspan typically did not speak
during this first round and, although he called
on the other participants in no fixed order, it is
generally the case that the Reserve Bank presidents
spoke prior to the Board members.
The second round of the meeting was devoted
to the discussion of policy options and culminated
in a formal vote. After a staff presentation on
policy options, Greenspan provided an extended
discussion of his views before making a policy
recommendation. Other participants followed in
no fixed order.3 At the end of the second round,
Greenspan made a final proposal and a formal vote
was taken, with the Chairman casting his vote
first.4 Although there are only 12 voting members
on the FOMC at any given time, it was typical for
all 19 policy officials (the seven Board members
and the 12 Bank presidents) to participate in both
rounds of the discussion. Over the period exam-
ined in this study, the minutes of each meeting—
including the operational policy directive as well
as the votes cast by policymakers—were published
about six weeks after each FOMC meeting.
Unlike the minutes, which are brief and report
discussion without attribution, the published
transcripts provide a relatively complete account
of FOMC meetings. The transcripts are, for the
most part, verbatim, although they have been
lightly edited to provide clarification (when nec-
essary) and to excise discussion of specific sources
(when release of this information could under-
mine the FOMC’s access to information5). What
becomes clear when reading the transcripts is that,
during the second round of the discussion, all
participants generally have voiced an explicit
policy preference. Thus, collecting these prefer-
ences offers the possibility to look at “opinions”
rather than votes.
For the 1989-97 period, I examined two
“dimensions” to the policy under consideration
at each FOMC meeting: the level of the short-term
interest rate, or federal funds rate, and the “bias”
or “tilt” in the policy directive. Both of these
“dimensions” were contained in the policy direc-
tive that the FOMC issued internally at the con-
clusion of each meeting to direct the Open Market
Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in
its implementation of monetary policy. Prior to
August 1997, the directive did not refer explicitly
to the FOMC’s objective for the federal funds rate,
but was written instead solely in terms of the
desired degree of restraint on reserve positions.6
The FOMC moved to a borrowed reserves operat-
ing procedure in September 1982 and switched
at some point later to targeting the federal funds
rate. Because the move to a funds target was not
announced publicly, the timing of the switch has
been the subject of some debate. Greenspan (1997)
has stated that the FOMC sets “the funds rate
directly in response to a wide variety of factors
and forecasts” and that this has been the practice
“increasingly since 1982”; this suggests that the
move to funds rate targeting was gradual and that
there was no precise point at which the switch
occurred. Nevertheless, several researchers have
attempted to date this change in procedure.
Thornton (2004) claims that the move to a funds
target occurred relatively soon after 1982, based
on an examination of the FOMC transcripts.
Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Hamilton and Jorda
(2002), and Kalyvitis and Michaelides (2001) use
vector autoregressions to date the move and argue
that it occurred somewhat later. The findings of
all of these studies indicate that the FOMC had
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3 It was often the case that the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (who serves as the FOMC’s vice chairman) was
the second speaker.
4 The FOMC’s vice chairman voted second, followed by other voters
in alphabetical order.
5 Greenspan (1995) has indicated that material is redacted from the
transcripts “primarily to protect the confidentiality of foreign and
domestic sources of intelligence that would dry up if their informa-
tion were made public. Included in that category is some informa-
tion supplied to us by foreign central banks and other government
entities.”
6 The operative sentence in the directive from the August 1997
meeting read: “In the implementation of policy for the immediate
future, the Committee seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent
with maintaining the federal funds rate at an average of around 5-1/2
percent.” Prior to that meeting, there was no explicit reference to the
desired level for the federal funds rate. For example, the operative
sentence in the directive from the July 1997 meeting was: “In the
implementation of policy for the immediate future, the Committee
seeks to maintain the existing degree of pressure on reserve 
positions.”switched to targeting the funds rate by 1989, the
first year in my data sample.
The bias in the policy directive, which was
introduced in 1983 and discontinued in 2000, was
a statement about likely future changes in the
stance of monetary policy. If the likelihood of
future tightening and easing were equally bal-
anced, the bias was “symmetric.” If the likelihood
of future policy was unbalanced, then the bias was
asymmetric in the direction of the most likely
action. Thornton and Wheelock (2000) discuss
three possible interpretations of the bias: that it
gave the Chairman the discretion to alter policy
between FOMC meetings, that it pointed to the
likely course for future policy, and that it was used
to build consensus among FOMC voters. Their
study finds some evidence for the last of these
three interpretations.7
In the next section, I discuss the construction
of the preference dataset. In the third section, I use
the preference data to examine several aspects of
the meeting: The data indicate that Greenspan’s
policy proposal was almost never amended before
being put to a formal vote. In addition, the rate
of disagreement based on preferences was higher
than the rate of official dissent, and it was higher
for those policymakers who did not eventually
cast an official vote than for those who did. In the
subsequent section, I investigate the role played
by the bias in the policy directive and whether it
helped to forge consensus by looking at policy-
makers who changed their opinion between the
voiced round and the official vote.
THE PREFERENCE DATA
The preference dataset supplements the
dataset constructed by Meade and Sheets (2004)
for their study of regional influences on FOMC
voting behavior. Policy preferences were deter-
mined from reading the second round discussion
for 72 FOMC meetings from 1989 through 1997.
The dataset excludes the 12 earliest meetings in
Greenspan’s term (August 1987 through December
1988) for two reasons: First, the structure of the
first several meetings differed somewhat from the
structure described above; and, second, it was
sometimes difficult to sort out policymaker prefer-
ences for the interest rate, owing to some (at times
considerable) confusion between the borrowed
reserves target and the interest rate objective. To
the extent that Greenspan’s stature has risen over
his tenure and, with it, the authority of his policy
proposals, the exclusion of these early meetings
should, ceteris paribus, bias agreement with his
proposals upward (by ignoring meetings at which
participants were more likely to disagree with
him).
Information on preferences with respect to the
short-term interest rate and the bias in the policy
directive permitted the construction of three
variables:
1. A multinomial variable indicating whether
the policymaker expressed agreement (0),
argued for a higher federal funds rate (+1),
or argued for a lower federal funds rate
(–1) relative to Greenspan’s proposal.
2. A basis-point variable indicating the size of
the interest rate move advocated (in basis
points) relative to Greenspan’s proposal
for the funds rate; for example, if a policy-
maker wanted an increase of 50 basis points
in the funds rate and Greenspan had pro-
posed an increase of 25 basis points, this
variable would be set equal to +25. The
variable would also equal +25 if a policy-
maker preferred to leave rates unchanged
when Greenspan proposed a 25-basis-point
decline.  On the other hand, if a policy-
maker wanted a 25-basis-point increase
and Greenspan proposed a 50-basis-point
increase, then this variable would be set
equal to –25.
3. A multinomial variable recording whether
the policymaker expressed agreement (0),
argued for greater asymmetry toward tight-
ening (+1), or argued for greater asymmetry
toward easing (–1) relative to Greenspan’s
proposal for the bias.
There were 35 individual policymakers other
than Greenspan who participated in the 72 meet-
ings covered in the dataset. The dataset records
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7 Most other studies of the bias look at its predictive power for
future changes in short-term interest rates.  For example, see Lapp
and Pearce (2000).
 at most one preference voiced on the interest rate
and one preference voiced on the bias in the policy
directive for each individual at each meeting. 
There is no view recorded if no preference
was expressed or if the policymaker’s view was
not clear. In addition, the dataset does not record
a view if the policymaker was absent from a meet-
ing or if the position was vacant at a particular
meeting (opinions voiced by first vice presidents
sitting in for Reserve Bank presidents were not
included, and at no time during the period studied
did a first vice president cast an official vote).
As shown in Table 1, policymakers expressed
an opinion regarding the direction of the interest
rate on 1,205 occasions (98.4 percent of the total),
a view about the magnitude of the interest rate
move (in basis points) on 1,162 occasions (94.9
percent of the total), and a preference for the bias
in the policy directive on 1,017 occasions (83 per-
cent of the total). The table also offers a frequency
distribution of the preference data by variable:
For each of the 35 policymakers, the table provides
the percentage of meetings attended for which it
was possible to code a preference. Coding rates
were highest for preferences on the short-term
interest rate, with 100 percent of meetings coded
for 24 of 35 policymakers. In contrast, the bias
was the most difficult to code (many policymakers
did not discuss it in their second-round remarks)
and only 5 of 35 policymakers have a bias prefer-
ence recorded 100 percent of the time. That policy-
makers voiced an opinion about the short-term
interest rate with greater frequency than they did
about the bias in the policy directive may owe
to the fact that the bias played a secondary role
because it related to future policy, whereas the
short-term interest rate was the immediate policy
instrument. Finally, the dataset includes the 732
official votes cast by these 35 policymakers over
the sample period.8
In constructing this original dataset, I exer-
cised some judgment to ensure consistency across
meetings and to remedy problems with interpre-
tation—four examples follow. First, in a few cases,
policymakers expressed indifference between
Greenspan’s proposal and some other alterna-
tive; these cases were coded as agreement with
Greenspan. Any bias introduced by this would
tend to understate the extent of voiced disagree-
ment. Second, if a policymaker indicated that he
Meade
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8 Official votes were cast for an interest rate/policy bias combination.
Table 1
Preferences Recorded in Dataset: Total and by Individual Policymaker for FOMC Meetings,
1989-97
Variable 1:  Variable 2:  Variable 3: 
directional interest rate indicator basis point indicator bias indicator
Preferences coded 1,205 1,162 1,017
Percent of total* 98.4 94.9 83.0
Frequency distribution of 
policymaker response rates:
Less than 80% 0 1 8
80% to less than 90% 1 3 13
90% to less than 100% 10 14 9
100% 24 17 5
Lowest response rate (%) for an 
individual policymaker: 84.8 71.7 47.1
*The total number of possible responses was 1,225, reflecting the total number of FOMC meetings attended by 35 policymakers over
the sample period.
 could not decide between two different policy
alternatives in the Fed staff’s Bluebook, his pref-
erence was coded by averaging the two Bluebook
alternatives. Third, when policymakers discussed
their views in terms of the Bluebook alternatives
but did not give adequate information to interpret
their opinion, the Bluebook was obtained and used
to remedy the confusion.9 Fourth, a preference
for a “small” change in the funds rate was inter-
preted as equivalent to a change of 25 basis points,
as this was the magnitude of the smallest change
considered over most of the sample period.10
The preference dataset does not adequately
reflect the complexity of the meeting debate in
two circumstances when a change in policy was
contingent on the success of some other policy
initiative (the passage of the federal budget in
October 1990) or linked to some other Fed policy
change (a move in the discount rate in November
1991). Finally, as discussed in Thornton and
Wheelock (2000), the transcripts reveal some
disagreements with respect to the purpose of the
bias in the policy directive. At times, policymakers
differentiate between a “hard” and “soft” asym-
metry in the policy bias, with the former indicat-
ing a greater likelihood of subsequent interest rate
change than the latter. In constructing the prefer-
ence dataset, I did not distinguish between these
two types of asymmetry.
The dataset examines only face-to-face FOMC
meetings and excludes conference calls. From
1989 through 1997, there were 39 conference calls,
most of which took place before 1995. Eighteen of
the calls dealt with issues not related to the setting
of the federal funds rate, while 12 were discus-
sions of the economic situation; in the remaining
9, Greenspan announced a change in short-term
interest rates.11 A formal vote was not taken dur-
ing these conference calls, although, on two occa-
sions, Greenspan proposed a change in the funds
rate and solicited views from participants.
WHAT DO THE PREFERENCE
DATA TELL US?
In this section, I use the dataset of voiced
preferences to answer three questions:
1. How often was Greenspan’s initial proposal
the voted outcome of an FOMC meeting?
2. Did policymakers who did not cast an official
vote behave the same as the ones who did?
3. How often did voting policymakers change
their position after voicing an opinion?
Table 2 provides an answer to the first ques-
tion. Greenspan’s interest rate proposals were
adopted by the Committee in all cases.12 With
regard to the bias, on two occasions the outcome
voted by the FOMC differed from Greenspan’s
initial proposal and on another two occasions he
expressed no preference. It is not possible from
Meade
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Table 2
Instances When Greenspan’s Proposal Was Not Adopted: FOMC Meetings, 1989-97
Date of meeting Greenspan proposal Voted outcome
Bias August 1989 Symmetric Asymmetric (–1)
November 1991 No preference Asymmetric (–1)
March 1994 Asymmetric (+1) Symmetric
November 1995 No preference Symmetric
11 In three of the nine instances in which Greenspan announced an
adjustment to the target for the federal funds rate, the Board had voted
for a change in the discount rate just prior to the conference call.
12 In October 1990, Greenspan’s proposal for a 25-basis-point easing
was contingent on the passage of the federal budget. Although the
official outcome of the meeting yielded no immediate change in the
funds rate, the FOMC voted on and agreed to Greenspan’s contin-
gency action.
9 Bluebooks from 15 FOMC meetings were used in the construction
of the dataset.
10 Since August 1989, the FOMC has changed its target for the funds
rate in multiples of 25 basis points.Table 2 to determine whether the success of
Greenspan’s proposals arose because he accurately
anticipated the group’s view or whether there
existed some internal pressure not to disagree
with him.
The answer to question 2 can be seen in
Table 3, which breaks down the voiced prefer-
ences into those expressed by non-voters and those
expressed by policymakers (“voters”) who cast
an official FOMC vote: 34 percent of non-voters
voiced disagreement with Greenspan’s interest
rate proposal, as compared with only 28 percent of
voters. Using binomial proportions, it is possible
to test whether 34 percent is significantly different
from 28 percent (the alternative hypothesis) against
the null hypothesis that the two percentages are
equal.13 The test statistic is 2.14, and the differ-
ence in disagreement rates is statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level. Non-voters were less
likely than voters to express disagreement with
Greenspan’s bias proposal—44 percent vs. 49
percent, respectively—but this difference is not
statistically significant.14
More striking, however, is the disparity
between the disagreement rate based on voiced
preferences and the 7.5 percent dissent rate in
official votes. In answer to question 3, it is clear
that voters frequently advocated one policy but
voted for another. Thus, disagreement in the
internal discussion cannot be ascertained by look-
ing at the published votes. What explains this?
It may well be the case that when a policymaker
disagreed with Greenspan, but his disagreement
was small, then he would voice disagreement
but not cast an official dissent. This would sug-
gest some “threshold” for the difference between
the policymaker’s preferred interest rate and
Greenspan’s proposed setting, above which a
voting policymaker would dissent, but below
which he would not.15 Such “threshold” behavior
might reflect a belief that a large number of official
dissents would weaken the Federal Reserve as
an institution. It might also reflect a view that,
since it is the Fed Chairman who must testify in
Congress and justify monetary policy decisions,
a policymaker should support the Chairman
when possible. Finally, since monetary policy is
a dynamic process, policymakers may desire to
express their preferences during FOMC delibera-
tions in order to have an influence on future policy,
even if they do not cast a dissenting vote at that
meeting. Whatever the reason for the discrepancy
between voiced disagreement and official dissent,
the data confirm the description of FOMC delib-
erations in Blinder et al. (2001).
Interestingly, a study by Epstein, Segal, and
Spaeth (2001) found a very similar discrepancy
in the dissent rates of official decisions and inter-
nal conference votes (9 percent vs. 40 percent,
respectively) for the U.S. Supreme Court in the
late 1800s. Monetary policymakers at the Bank
of England have been more inclined to dissent in
their official votes than FOMC members (the dis-
sent rate averaged 17 percent from mid-1998 to
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13 The test statistic, 
where p1 is the percentage of voters voicing disagreement and p2
is the percentage of non-voters voicing disagreement, is distrib-
uted approximately normally.
14 The test statistic is 1.54.
Zpp p p n n = −− + ( )/ *( )*[( / ) ( / )] 1 21 1 1 1 2
Table 3
Preferences Voiced in Round 2 and Official Votes: FOMC Meetings, 1989-97
Non-voters Voters
Total Disagreement (%) Total Disagreement (%)
Voiced rate 477 34.0 728 28.2
Voiced bias 376 44.1 641 49.1
Official vote (rate/bias) 732 7.5
15 Meade and Sheets (2004) formulate this sort of model of FOMC
voting behavior.
 mid-2002); but, as no record of internal discus-
sions is publicly available, it is not possible to
compare their official dissent rate with their
internal disagreement rate. The Bank requires its
Monetary Policy Committee members to be “indi-
vidually accountable” for their votes, and this
requirement may tend to counteract pressure to
vote as a group.
THE ROLE OF THE BIAS IN THE
POLICY DIRECTIVE
Over the 1989-97 period studied in this paper,
an official FOMC vote was cast for a short-term
interest rate and policy bias combination. My
preference dataset records views about these two
“dimensions” separately. Although some studies
have looked at whether the bias is a good predictor
of future short-term interest rates, I am interested
to examine another aspect of the bias—that it aided
in the formation of consensus. Thornton and
Wheelock (2000) have also tested the consensus-
formation hypothesis; they found that in 135 meet-
ings from 1983-99 the FOMC was more likely to
adopt asymmetric directives when it voted not
to change the target for the federal funds rate. All
of the prior studies that have examined the role
played by the bias (consensus-formation or other-
wise) have used data on the federal funds rate and
the direction of the bias.
Although it is not clear at first glance how
FOMC voters weighed the two “dimensions” of
the decision when casting their vote, as stated
earlier it seems likely that the level of the short-
term interest rate figured more importantly than
the bias in the policy directive.16 Thus, I assume
that an official FOMC vote represents a vote on the
interest rate and can be compared to the voiced
preference on that rate, and, given that assump-
tion, I investigate the role played by the bias.
The role played by the bias is tested by exam-
ining whether voters who voiced disagreement
with Greenspan’s proposed interest rate but then
cast an official vote in support of that interest rate
could have been influenced by the bias. For exam-
ple, a voter who voiced a preference for reducing
short-term rates might have been willing to sup-
port Greenspan’s proposal for no change in interest
rates if he thought that an asymmetric bias toward
easing would increase the probability that future
policy would be appropriate.17 The precise test
is as follows: For the voters who voice rate dis-
agreement but cast an official assent (see Table 4),
I examine whether the policy bias adopted by the
FOMC goes in the direction of the original rate
preference expressed by the policymaker (the
alternative hypothesis) or whether the policy bias
adopted appears unrelated to the original rate
preference (the null hypothesis). Table 5 shows
that, for 19 of 22 cases in which a policymaker
voiced a preference for lower interest rates but
cast an assenting vote, the adopted bias was asym-
metric toward easing; for 13 of 26 cases in which
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Table 4
Policymakers Who Voiced Rate Disagreement in Round 2 and Cast an Official Assent: FOMC
Meetings, 1989-97
Official vote
–1 0 +1 Total
Rate preference voiced in round 2
–1 0 22 0 22
+1 0 26 0 26
16 In addition, transcripts from a number of FOMC meetings include
debate among policymakers about the meaning of the bias, indicating
that there was no single interpretation of its role.
17 Lapp and Pearce (2000) find that an asymmetric policy directive
increases the probability of a change in the federal funds target in
the direction of the asymmetry. However, they do not test whether
target changes are more frequent under asymmetric directives.
Thornton and Wheelock (2000) do not find evidence for this latter
hypothesis.a policymaker voiced a preference for higher inter-
est rates but cast an assenting vote, the adopted
bias was asymmetric toward tightening. A test of
the hypothesis that the switch was related to the
direction of the bias (32 of 48 cases) against the
null hypothesis that the voiced rate preference
and bias were independent results in a test statistic
of 4.9618; the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1
percent level of significance.
This test ignores instances in which a policy-
maker voiced agreement with the rate proposal but
subsequently voted against it. There are 14 such
instances, individually documented in Table 6,
and in all of these cases the voter voiced agreement
with the rate proposal but cast an official dissent
expressly because of the bias. Nine of these cases
occurred during 1991-92, and involved two indi-
viduals—Board member LaWare and St. Louis
Bank president Melzer. The FOMC transcripts
indicate that LaWare and Melzer supported
Greenspan’s proposal for no change in the level of
the funds target, but disagreed strongly with the
Meade
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Table 6
Instances When Policymakers Voiced Rate Agreement in Round 2 and Cast an Official Dissent:
FOMC Meetings, 1989-97
Meeting date Official Rate proposal Desired bias Actual bias
March 1989 Seger Agree Symmetric Tightening
August 1989 Guffey Agree Symmetric Easing
October 1989 Guffey Agree Symmetric Easing
December 1991 LaWare Agree Symmetric Easing
Melzer Agree Symmetric Easing
June 1992 LaWare Agree Symmetric Easing
Melzer Agree Symmetric Easing
August 1992 LaWare Agree Symmetric Easing
Melzer Agree Symmetric Easing
October 1992 LaWare Agree Symmetric Easing
Melzer Agree Symmetric Easing
November 1992 LaWare Agree Symmetric Easing
Melzer Agree Symmetric Easing
May 1993 Boehne Agree Symmetric Tightening
Table 5
Voiced Rate Disagreement and Adopted Bias for Policymakers Who Voiced Rate Disagreement
in Round 2 and Cast an Official Assent: FOMC Meetings, 1989-97
Bias adopted by FOMC
–1 0 +1 Total
Rate preference voiced in round 2
–1 19 3 0 22
+1 4 9 13 26
Total 23 12 13 48
18 Using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution, the
test statistic is normally distributed with mean equal to np and vari-
ance equal to np(1 – p), where n is the total number of observations
and p is the probability of occurrence under the null hypothesis.
 asymmetric policy directive toward ease (both offi-
cials called for a symmetric bias). Greenspan made
six intermeeting adjustments to the federal funds
target during 1991-92, and it could be that the
LaWare and Melzer dissents were a reaction to
these intermeeting adjustments. It is likely that
Greenspan would have had less latitude for inter-
meeting adjustments to the funds target under
the symmetric directive favored by LaWare and
Melzer.19
CONCLUSION
This paper develops and uses an original
dataset collected from the internal discussion of
the Fed’s monetary policy committee (the FOMC
transcripts) to examine questions about the Com-
mittee’s behavior. The data show that Greenspan’s
proposals, after Committee discussion, were nearly
always adopted unmodified in the formal vote.
Despite the external appearance of consensus with
little disagreement over decisions and an official
dissent rate of 7.5 percent, the data reveal that
the rate of disagreement in internal Committee
discussions was quite high—on the order of 30
percent for discussions of the short-term interest
rate. And, under the assumption that FOMC voters
assigned a higher priority to their preferences for
the short-term interest rate than the bias in the
policy directive, it can be shown that this bias
was important for achieving consensus, which
supports and extends the results of Thornton
and Wheelock (2000). Thus, the novel dataset
described in this paper helps to shed some light
on the internal workings of the FOMC in the
Greenspan years.
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